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Abstract 
This thesis demonst rates a real time automated hybrid method for process monitor-
ing. Motivation of this research comes from the fact that there is hardly any single 
techniques available which is decent enough for process fault detection and diagnosis 
simultaneously. Process history based methods are well known as early fault detec-
tors but operators require complex analysis to find out the root cause of the fault. 
Knowledge based qualitative models are worthy for root cause analysis but mostly 
done in off-line fashion. Moreover, modern processes are equipped with thousands 
of variables and structurally they are very complex in nature. All these influences 
make manual diagnostic task more complicated for the operators. Therefore, there is 
a need for automated process monitoring tool that has good detection and diagnosis 
performance. 
In this work, a hybrid method based on principal component analysis (P CA) and 
Bayesian belief network (BBN) is described for process monitoring. P CA is very 
proficient as early faul t detector but not for faul t diagnosis. On the other hand , 
BBN is good for diagnosis. This hybrid method combines t he strong features of both 
PCA and BBN to an automated monitoring system that can detect fault early as well 
as diagnose the root cause precisely. Upon successful detection of fault from PCA, 
diagnostic information from the P CA is passed to the BBN for root cause analysis. 
Pearl's message passing algorithm is used for belief updating. This monitoring tool 
11 
integrates prior process knowledge along with the present observed evidence processed 
by the multivariate sta tistical method to come up with the most probable explanation 
of process fault. Efficacy of the proposed method is verified by simulating different 
scenarios on a simulated dissolution tank model. The monitoring tool is also validated 
using indust rial data from a pure terephthalic acid (PTA) plant . 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Although large scale accidents do not happen frequently in the industries but these 
accidents can have significant consequences. It has been reported in the literature 
that petrochemicals industry alone losses estimated 20 billion dollars every year due 
to such accidents [Venkatasubramanian et al. , 2003c]. In the recent era, researchers 
from both academic and industries are concentrating more on the topics like early 
fault detection and correct diagnosis of the root cause of a process fault. While the 
plant is still operating in a controllable region early detection and diagnosis can help 
to avoid abnormal event progression and reduce productivity loss. 
The term fault is generally defined as a departure from an acceptable range of an 
observed variable or a calculated parameter associated with a process [Himmelblau, 
1978] . For example, no coolant flow rate resulting in high temperature in a reactor 
can be considered as process fault . The underlying cause of this abnormality could 
be a failed coolant pump or a poorly tuned controller , is called the basic event or the 
root cause. The main sources of process faults are mainly parameter changes in a 
1 
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system due to the disturbance, process structural change due to hard failure of the 
equipment, malfunctioning sensors and actuators. Monitoring is established to detect 
and diagnose such faults. Process monitoring is served in two steps: first step is to 
detect the process fault; in second step, the root cause of the fault is diagnosed to 
help the operators to take the most appropriate corrective action. Many automated 
fault detection and diagnosis methods are available. But human operators play a very 
important role both in control task and monitoring the process plants during both 
the normal and abnormal conditions. 
Success of the diagnostic tasks largely depends on the operators expertise. Re-
sponding to the abnormal events in a process is crucial as erroneous judgement of an 
operator can lead to a catastrophic accident. Complexity and the size of the modern 
process plants add more hurdle in monitoring task. In addition, quick diagnosis is 
desired to successfully mit igate the abnormal condition in the process plants. Ac-
cording to the industrial statistics, human error is the main reason for about 70% of 
the industrial accidents. These abnormal events have significant economic, safety and 
environmental impact [Venkatasubramanian et al. , 2003c]. 
To avoid the human error and help the operators during process fault, automa-
tion in detection and diagnosis is the first step in abnormal event management. Var-
ious computer aided approaches have been developed over t he years to solve the 
process fault diagnosis problem. T hey cover a wide variety of techniques including 
multi-variate statistical techniques (e.g. principal component analysis (PCA), partial 
least square (PLS)), observer based methods (e.g. Kalman filter , particle fi lter), fault 
trees and digraphs, analytical approaches, knowledge-based systems, neural networks 
etc. In general the multivariate statistical techniques are successful in detecting fault 
early and knowledge based methods are preferred for fault diagnosis. There is a lack 
of a comprehensive fault detection and diagnosis tool that can detect the fault early, 
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diagnose the root cause and guide the operator in the recovery of the process. In 
this t hesis, this problem has been investigated and a hybrid method is proposed as a 
solut ion of t his problem. 
1.2 Objective 
The main objective of this research is to build an automated fault diagnostic tool for 
process plants that can use both on-line measurements and process knowledge to find 
root cause of the fault precisely. The aim of this monitoring tool is to minimize the 
human error in the diagnosis of fault and improve the overall safety of the process. 
The objectives of the current research is summarized as below 
Develop an automated monitoring tool that can detect fault early and diag-
nose the root cause precisely. Thus help operators to steer the process to safe 
operating condition, prevent loss in productivity and accidents in process. 
ii Minimize complex analysis by operators for root cause analysis and to reduce 
both human error and ambiguity in diagnosis. 
iii Incorporate on-line measurement with process knowledge for precise diagnosis. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis consists of six chapters. This first chapter provides a brief description 
about process fault and its consequences followed by motivation and objectives of this 
thesis. 
Chapter 2 covers extensive literature review on process fault detection and di-
agnosis. The advantages and deficiencies of the different methods are discussed and 
the gap in the research is ident ified. 
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Chapter 3 describes the method to construct a Bayesian belief network (BBN) 
for process systems. The BBN is mapped from signed directed graph (SDG). The 
methodology is validated by simulation. 
Chapter 4 introduces the hybrid methodology for process fault detection and 
diagnosis. This hybrid tool is a combination of PCA and BBN. Detailed steps of the 
algorithm are discussed in this chapter. 
Implementation of the proposed method is described in Chapter 5 with both 
simulation and industrial case studies. The results confi rm competence of the moni-
toring tool by detecting and diagnosing the fault precisely. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with crit ical findings of this research followed by 
recommendations for future work. 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
On-line process monitoring is one of the most important research topic in process 
industries. Researchers developed various amount of methodologies for process mon-
itoring from different perspectives. The most popular FDD methods used in the 
process industries are discussed in the following sections. 
2.1 Quantitative Model Based FDD 
Quantitative model based methods use explicit system models developed either from 
laws of physics or identified models from identification experiment. T he most widely 
used approaches for quantitative model based algorithms are diagnostic observers, 
parity relations, Kalman filt ers, state-space models, input-output relationship, first 
Principal models, frequency response models etc are reported in different literatures 
[Venkatasubramanian et al. , 2003c, Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003a]. 
The observer-based FDD algorithms use a bank of observers to generate residuals 
[Frank and Ding, 1997]. Each one of this residual is sensitive to a particular type of 
fault while it remains insensit ive to the remaining faults and unknown inputs. During 
normal operating condition , observers track the process closely and the residuals from 
5 
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the unknown inputs will be small. However, when a fault occurs, all observers which 
are made insensit ive to the fault by design, continue to develop small residuals. On 
the other hand , observers which are sensitive to the fault will deviate from the process 
significantly and result in residuals of large magnitude. Fault isolation become easy 
since these observers are designed for part icular faults . [Yoon and MacGregor, 2000] 
applied this observer based methodology successfully for a CSTR plant for detecting 
fault. More application of observer based FDD methods can be found in [Frank, 1994]. 
The fault signal might get obscured due to sensor noise and disturbance. Filters are 
designed to separate t he effect of faults and noise from the residual signal so that they 
can be easily differentiated [P.M. Frank, 1989]. 
Parity equation relations check is one of popular method for model based FDD 
and application of this method can be found in [Gertler and Monajemy, 1995]. The 
main idea is to check the inconsistency of the plant models prediction compare to the 
sensor outputs (measurements). 
( ) = (A(s) _ A(s)) () r s B ( ) ~ u s 
s B(s) (2. 1) 
Eqn. 2. 1 is called the parity equation where r( s) is the residual generated by 
the parity equation. Process is described by ;f:~ where A(s) is the output parameters 
and B ( s) is the input parameter of the process. Model is described by ~~:~ where 
A ( s) is the output parameters and B ( s) is the input parameter of the process model. 
Assumptions associated with the parity equation method are no process uncer-
tainty, no modelling errors and explicit model can explain all faults. If any of these 
assumptions is violated, the performance will be degraded. Another assumption is 
that parity relations are considered as linear model. Linear models are valid only 
around the operating conditions at which the non-linear process is approximated as 
linear. The parity relation approach thus cannot be easily applied to batch or non-
7 
linear processes where operating conditions vary continuously. 
Kalman filter is very popular in chemical industries as state estimator. Kalman 
filter estimates all process states and can be used for residual generation for measured 
process states. Generated residuals indica te the presence of fault [Benkouider et al. , 
2009, Chang and Chen, 1995]. 
[Isermann, 1997] proposed a model parameter estimation method for fault de-
tection. Model parameters are also affected by process faults . Through parameter 
estimation method model parameters for the normal operating condition are deter-
mined initially. These parameters are compared to the parameters obtained from 
the on-line process measurements. Any significant change from the normal operating 
range is denoted as fault. 
In the early days hardware redundancy was mainly used for fault detection. 
Measurements from the redundant sensors were compared for variat ion. If inconsis-
tency is found in the measurement , sensor fault is reported. This technique is for 
sensor fault detection is known as voting scheme [Willsky, 1976]. If hardware redun-
dancy is available, voting schemes can quickly identify sensor fault. The advantage is 
that the faulty sensors are removed smoothly from consideration reducing the num-
ber of false alarms. Application of this type of FDD method can be found in aircraft 
space vehicles and nuclear power plants. Due to the extra cost and additional space 
required , hardware redundancy is less popular and more interest is shifting towards 
analytical redundancy [Frank, 1990]. 
Analytical redundancy uses functional dependency of the process variables. 
Input-output relation of the process variables are expressed in terms of algebraic 
relation. This is useful for computing the value of a particular variable given that the 
states of the process variable and the measurements of the other sensors are known. 
Difference between the measured signal and the calculated value from the algebraic 
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relation is known as residual. If significant deviation is found between the measured 
value and calculated value, fault is ident ified [Chow and Willsky, 1984] . 
The problem associated with model based FDD is an explicit mathematical 
model of the system is required to generate the diagnostic residual. Most of the FDD 
model is constructed assuming the process to be linear which is seldom in practical 
life. Their application to a non-linear system requires a modellinearisation around the 
operating point . On top of that these models include some modelling error. Another 
lapse of the model based FDD approach is if the fault is not modelled properly then 
the fault may not be detected by the residual. All this can reduce the effectiveness of 
the method drastically. Often computational cost associated with deriving a model is 
very high and most of all very few mathematical models for a process can be found. 
2.2 Qualitative Knowledge based FDD 
Knowledge based models are usually developed from the fundamental understand-
ing of process dynamics. Signed directed graph (SDG), Baysian Network, Possible 
cause and effect graph (PCEG) etc are most common knowledge based model FDD 
approaches. 
Prior process knowledge is the key ingredient to build a knowledge based model. 
These models capture the cause and effect relationship among different process vari-
ables. and are expressed in terms of qualitative functions. These knowledge based 
systems are often computer aided programs which consists of various logics and con-
dit ional reasoning (If-else) [Venkatasubramanian et al. , 2003a]. 
Rule based expert systems applied for fault diagnosis are reported in a number 
of papers. These expert systems are often if-else rule based system with process 
knowledge extracted from the first principal of the process. The main objective of t he 
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expert system is to diagnosis a process fault and make a suggestion for the human 
operator to handle the fault properly. [Chen and Modarres, 1992] proposed an expert 
system which is capable of process fault diagnosis and suggestive to the operators for 
correct action during the abnormal condition in the process. The main advantages of 
expert systems as a diagnostic tool are ease of development and the ability to provide 
explanations for the solutions provided. 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is the most popular method in the industries for 
root cause analysis. FTA is a top down deductive failure analysis. Boolean logic 
and lower-level events are combined to analyse an undesired state of a system in 
FTA [Sklet, 2004] . Logical "AND" and "OR" gates are used to describe basic events 
propagation up to top-events. The qualitative structure of how fault occurs can be 
analysed using cut set analysis. The smallest number of events that leads to top-event 
is known as minimal cut set. Minimal cut sets can imply the safety of the system 
qualitatively [Woodward and Pitbaldo, 2010]. Fault t ree is used mainly for analysing 
system reliability and risk analysis along with detecting root cause of an abnormal 
condition. 
Cause-effect relationship of the process variables or models can be represented 
in the form of signed directed graphs (SDG). SDG was first introduced for process 
fault diagnosis by Iri, Aoki, O'Shima, and Matsuyama [Iri et al. , 1979]. Digraph 
consists of directed arcs between the nodes which represent each process variables. 
In SDG each directed arcs have a positive or negative sign attached to them. The 
directed arcs lead from the cause nodes to the effect nodes. Each node in the SDG 
represents the steady state of a process variable. SDG is relatively easy and simple to 
implement. The causal information can easily be converted into rules. SDG can be 
obtained either from the mathematical model of the process or from the operational 
data or differential equation of the process model [Umeda et al. , 1980] . SDGs are 
---- ----------------------------------------- ------- - -
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very efficient way of represent ing qualitative models graphically. It has been the most 
widely used as causal knowledge based process fault diagnosis algorithm [Yang et al. , 
2010] . Once a process fault has been detected , knowledge based model can find the 
root cause. 
Several enhanced version of SDG are developed , such as, possible cause effect 
graph (PCEG), to overcome some of the limitations of SDG is proposed by [Leung 
and Romagnoli, 2000]. In traditional SDG approach, state of each node is restricted 
to the high, normal and low states. In PCEG, more meaningful state description 
about the nodes are used. This makes knowledge representation more user-friendly 
and flexible. Another major improvement in P CEG over SDG is the distinct definition 
of root causes. PCEG diagnose the root cause with the proper process knowledge. 
Although all the above methods are very easy to set up but one of the main 
limitations of these diagnosis methods is they do not give a measure of the uncertainty 
in the diagnostic information. Since in a diagnosis numerous noisy and incomplete 
sources of evidence are assimilated , it is important to quantify the uncertainty in 
the decision. In this context, Bayesian belief network (BBN) can overcome some 
limitation of the above stated knowledge based methods. A Bayesian belief network 
is a probabilistic graphical model (a type of statistical model) that represents a set 
of random variables and their condi tional dependencies via a directed acyclic graph 
(DAG) in terms of conditional probability table. BBN can represent the probabilistic 
relationships among the causal variables. Given effects, the network can be used to 
compute the probabilities of the presence of various causes [Krieg, 2001, eapolitan 
and Jiang, 2010, eapolitan, 2004]. This allows to diagnose the root cause for ab-
normal conditions. Bayesian belief networks are very popular in process reliability 
assessment and root cause analysis [Wilson and Huzurbazar, 2007]. 
BBN is a probabilistic approach and thus it can capture the uncertainty in 
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the diagnosis. Some of t he benefits are capability to model complex systems, make 
predictions as well as diagnose the root cause, compute the occurrence probability 
of an event, update the calculations according to evidences, represent multi-modal 
variables and to help modelling user-friendly by a graphical and compact approach 
[Bobbio et al. , 2001]. An early warning system for root cause analysis using BBN is 
developed by [Pradhan et al. , 2007]. Since it is difficult to represent process knowledge 
directly in a BBN an equivalent model was built from first principle of the system and 
used for probabilistic reasoning and root cause analysis . [Azhdari and Mehranbod, 
2010] showed application of BBN for industrial fault diagnosis. Tennessee Eastman 
process was selected for testing the effectiveness of BBN as an industrial diagnostic 
tool. BBN was developed from the process knowledge of the system and it diagnosed 
some known faults successfully. However, it is assumed that faults do not occur 
simultaneously. A comprehensive review on BBN as a fault diagnosis tool can be 
found in [Weber et al. , 2012, Guo and Hsu, 2002] . 
[S . Dey, 2005] used BBN for fault diagnosis. Pearl's direct message passing 
algorithm was implemented to update probability of each node in BBN. Posterior 
probabili ty of each node is updated from evidence. To explain very simply, when new 
evidence is introduced into the network, each node updates its own belief, based on 
message received from its parents and children and correspondingly generate message 
to be sent to its children. This process is repeated unt il the network is stabilized . 
The successive stages of belief propagation is shown in Fig. 2.1. Here, it is 
assumed that evidences e1 and e2 are introduced. Initially the BBN is in equilibrium 
Fig. 2.1(a). As soon as two evidences are introduced Fig. 2.1(b) belief propagation 
is init iated . At this stage belief of the child node (evidence entering node) is updated 
and a message to the corresponding parent node is sent. Then in Fig. 2.1(c) the 
intermediate node updates its belief and sent message to its parent and child node. 
12 
e2 
(a) (b) (c) 
(f) (e) (d) 
Figure 2.1: Impact of new evidence on belief propagation 
The top root node receive two messages from its children and updates its belief. This 
process continues for the six cycles, at which point all messages are propagated and the 
network reaches a new equilibrium. After that the network is ready to take another 
new evidence. However , this diagnosis method is not applicable for cyclic process 
since BBN is acyclic [Pearl , 1988] . 
Introduction of process knowledge to perform diagnose a fault has been recent 
interest of research. BBN brings value as it quantifies the uncertainty in the diagnosis 
and it can incorporate process knowledge. More recently BBN has been used to 
combine various fault detection and diagnosis methods. [Huang, 2008] used BBN 
to unite diagnostic information from various diagnostic tools to calculate the overall 
control loop performance. [Khakzad et al. , 2013] proposed BBN for dynamic safety 
analysis. Although bow tie is very popular method but they can not handle the 
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process uncertainty due to their static nature. Mapping bow tie into BBN helps to 
overcome the limitation. A case study from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board has been 
used to illustrate the application BBN techniques as a fault diagnosis tool. 
2.3 History based FDD 
Process data based historical methods rely on the availability of large amount of 
historical data. When the process is under control, the observations have distributions 
corresponding to the normal mode of operation. This distribution changes when the 
process is out of control. If a monitored variable is in normal operating condition, then 
its statistical parameters like mean and the standard deviation will be close to their 
normal values. But for faulty conditions, either the mean or the standard deviation or 
both may deviate from their nominal values. In on-line statistical approach, samples 
are taken sequentially and decisions are made based on the observations up to the 
current time [Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003b] . 
History based method includes both univariate and mult ivariate methods. In 
univariate analysis process measurements are compared to the threshold values for de-
tecting fault . Probability of fault increases as the process moves away from the normal 
operating condition [Mah and Tamhane, 2004] . Univariate statistical techniques are 
easy to implement. But they cannot distinguish between normal operational changes 
and abnormal changes which leads to significant number of false alarms. Also oper-
ators need to monitor trend of each variable separately this can easily overwhelm an 
operator. 
Compared to the univariate analysis, multivariate techniques are more robust 
to false alarm and successfully reduces the dimensionality of the system. Multivariate 
techniques monitor the correlation among different variables as well as the variables 
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in a lower dimensional space. They are also robust to the changes in the process 
due to controller actions, set point change or noise in the process. These techniques 
are capable of compressing data so that the original huge data set can be analysed 
easily with essential information is retained. For these reasons mult ivariate statistical 
methods such as principal component analysis (PCA) , independent component anal-
ysis (ICA), partial least squares (PLS) , Fisher discriminant analysis (FDA), subspace 
aided approach (SAP) are very popular in industries. [Yin et al. , 2012] applied dif-
ferent data driven techniques such as standard PCA, Dynamic P CA (DPCA), TPLS, 
MPLS, ICA,Subspace aided(SAP) to the bench-mark Tennessee Eastman process to 
compare their performance in fault detection. 
Multi-scale PCA (MPCA) is commonly used to monitor batch process. MPCA 
that combines wavelet filtering with PCA is proposed by [Misra et a l. , 2002] for process 
fault diagnosis. Multi-scale PCA is widely used for condit ion monitoring to detect 
equipment fault such as compressor, pump etc. 
Several variation of P CA has been developed to fulfi ll different needs for process 
monitoring. Dynamic PCA (DPCA) has been developed to account for the dynamic 
varia tion in the system . For non-linear systems, several non-linear P CA methods have 
been developed. [Choi et al. , 2005] proposed non-linear PCA-based method that uses 
kernel functions and showed better results. 
These statistical methods use contribut ion plots for fault diagnosis [Miller et al. , 
1998, Kourt i and MacGregor, 1996a] . The contributions are very easy to calculate. 
When the square prediction error (SPE), T 2 or Q-statistics violates its t hreshold limit 
the fault is detected. The contributions of the individual variables can be analysed 
for diagnosis. Those variables having large contributions to the fault are examined. 
The maximum contribut ion is indicated as possible causes [J ackson and Mudholkar, 
1979, Joe Qin, 2003]. Application of the contribution plots as a diagnostic tool in an 
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industrial batch processes can be found in [Kourti and MacGregor, 1996b, Westerhuis 
et al. , 2000]. For a more complex and realistic process, the operator needs to employ 
his experience to determine whether he should look at t he magnitude or the sign of 
the contributions, or a combination of both sign and magnitude. Monitoring hundreds 
of variables can be overwhelming to examine and it requires a complex analysis to 
find out the root cause from this cont ribution plot . Two common problems associated 
with the contribution plots are 
• A fault of small magnitude may not have the largest contribution . However, 
when fault magnitude is very large significant contribut ion is observed. This 
can be a source of misdiagnosis. 
• Often more than one variables are shown as faulty since the contribut ion of the 
each variable is calculated by a matrix multiplication [He et al. , 2005]. This is 
known as "smearing" effect and can reduce the significance between contributing 
and non-contributing variables. This can insert ambiguity in diagnosis task 
[CHEN et al. , 2011 , Alcala and Qin, 2009]. 
Data based process monitoring methods are very easy to implement and effective 
in detecting faults early but the diagnosis is not precise. The residual analysis is not 
enough to aid the operator in identifying the root cause. This is because, for a large 
process with many variables, t he interpretation of measured variable contributions is 
difficult. It needs complex analysis for the operators to detect the root cause from 
the contribution plot . Moreover, for the diagnosis task there is no mechanism to 
incorporate the expert knowledge. Therefore, recognizing the inadequacy of single-
method based approaches, researchers are now giving more attention to the hybrid 
methods. 
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2.4 Hybrid FDD 
Hybrid FDD models are the combination of two or more than two independent FDD 
models. The mot ivation for designing hybrid diagnostic systems arises due to the fact 
that there is no single method that meets all the requirements of a good diagnostic 
system, [Mylaraswamy and Venkatasubramanian , 1997]. Qualitative knowledge based 
diagnosis models such as signed directed graphs (SDGs) are good for root cause anal-
ysis rather than being early detectors. For large-scale or non-linear process, building 
a SDG based diagnosis model is tedious, [Yang et al. , 2010]. On the other hand, 
quantitative model-based methods are very efficient and sensitive to process fault . 
However requires significant computat ional effort and often explicit models for t he 
process are not available. Computational cost associated with developing statistical 
classifiers and neural networks are very low. They are relatively robust to noise and 
other model uncertainties present in the process but cannot provide adequate expla-
nations about the diagnostic reasoning. For example, PCA/ PLS based FDI scheme 
are efficient and quick at fault detection but from the contribution plot it requires 
a complex analysis to find out the root cause. Sometimes more than one variable is 
shown as faulty due to the smearing effect in the P CA which leads to an ambiguity 
in root cause analysis, [Yoon and MacGregor, 2000, Liu, 2012]. 
It is evident from the above discussion that one single method is not enough to 
develop an efficient FDI scheme. To combine the strength features and to comple-
ment for the shortcomings of various methods, hybrid methods have been proposed. 
[Becraft et al. , 1991] proposed an integrated methodology for faul t diagnosis with a 
neural network and an expert system. To diagnose the most commonly encountered 
faults in chemical process plants, a neural network was used. Once the faults are 
detected within a particular process by the neural network, a deep knowledge expert 
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system analyse the result and suggests mitigating action. 
A DKit (combination of neural network and SDG) based hybrid model was 
proposed by [Mylaraswamy and Venkatasubramanian, 1997]. The inability of SDG 
for timely fault detection is overcome by the strength of early detection abilit ies of 
neural networks and the inability of neural networks to provide insights for diagnosis 
was compensated by the SDG's accurate diagnostic power. The salient features of the 
DKi t and its performance was demonstrated successfully by simulating 13 different 
scenarios wi th Amoco FCCU process. 
[Vedam and Venkatasubramanian, 1999] proposed a P CA-SDG based hybrid 
methodology for fault detection and diagnosis. In order to perform diagnosis using 
SDGs alone, each measured variable need to be compared against the high and low 
thresholds to identify its deviation which is very difficult for a large process. PCA 
plays a vital role in dimension reduction of the analysis. 
A hybrid system with signed directed graphs (SDG) and fuzzy logic was proposed 
by [Enrique E. Tarifa, 2003]. The SDG model of the process was used to perform 
qualitative simulation to predict possible process behaviour for various faults. Those 
predictions are used to generate if-else rules that are evaluated by an expert system 
using information about the actual process state. 
[Weiqing et al., 2012] proposed an abnormal root cause diagnosis method com-
bining Kernal PCA (KPCA) and fuzzy probabilistic SDG (FPSDG). KPCA-FPSDG 
based hybrid model has the multivariate monitoring characteristics of KPCA and 
fault explanation capability of SDG. All the variables are monitored using KPCA. 
When a fault is detected , the abnormal variable is isolated from the FPSDG. Case 
studies show that the KPCA-FPSDG method can effectively monitor the thermal 
system process and find the anomaly source promptly. 
Although these SDG hybrid based models are efficient for the standard process 
~--------------------------------------·--------------
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but its application for t he complex process is limited . To overcome this limitation 
[Ozyurt and Kandel, 1996] int roduced a hybrid FDD technique combining neural net-
work and expert fuzzy logic. Author suggested hierarchical mult ilayer neural network 
structure to deal with the complex process. Fault is discovered by the neural network 
by pattern recognit ion comparing to the normal operating condition pattern. The 
fuzzy expert system diagnose the fault using process knowledge and input from the 
supervisory network and sub-networks. The result shows effectiveness of the proposed 
hybrid system and adaptive capability to deal with noise in the process. A hybrid 
system with signed directed graphs (SDG) and fuzzy logic have been proposed by 
Tarifa and Scenna. The SDG model of the process is used to perform qualitative sim-
ulation to predict possible process behaviours for various faults. Those predictions 
are used to generate if-else rules that are evaluated by an exper t system using infor-
mation about the actual process state [Enrique E. Tarifa, 2003]. [Sun et al., 2012] 
used a first-principle knowledge based model combined with a data-driven art ificial 
neural network model for process fault detection and diagnosis. It demonstrates good 
performance both in process moni toring and fault diagnosis. 
Extended Kalman filter (EKF) and neural network based hybrid FDD is pro-
posed by [Benkouider et al. , 2012]. T he EKF estimates the state of reactor as well as 
the overall heat t ransfer coefficient and x2 test is conducted on residual for the fault 
detection. T he identification of the fault is based on a probabilistic neural network 
model. Estimated EKF states of t he reactor along with the overall heat t ransfer coef-
ficient are the inputs for t he neural network model. The neural network model, with 
the help of process knowledge diagnoses the root cause precisely. T his hybrid model 
is validated both for simulated and experimental data sets for a chemical process re-
actor. Although this method is effective, it requires an explicit process model and 
neural network needs to be trained with process faults which limits its applicability. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
It is evident from the review that each method has its own strength and shortcomings. 
PCA can detect the fault early and has overwhelming popularity in process 
industries for fault detection. 
ii BBN is convenient for capturing process knowledge and the associated uncer-
tainty. 
m Combining more than one method can complement each other to over come 
limitations. Combination of knowledge based and data driven methods can 
deliver best result. Thus hybrid methods are becoming popular as FDD tool. 
These hybrid models could be a solution for automated process fault detection 
and diagnosis. 
iv Though many hybrid methods are available but they are not hybrid in true sense. 
The knowledge based diagnostic tools are not utilizing the limited diagnostic 
information from the quantitative methods. Also in many cases the diagnostic 
tools (e.g. neural network) requires huge database of faulty data which are 
difficult to obtain. 
v Considering the above facts hybrid method which combines PCA and BBN 
together is proposed in this thesis. P CA is very efficient for early fault detection 
and BBN captures process knowledge with uncertainty which can give accurate 
diagnosis of the root cause. This hybrid method combines the strong features 
of both PCA and BBN to overcome their individual limitations. 
Chapter 3 
Development of BBN for Process 
Systems 
In this chapter a method to develop a BBN for process system is described . Signed 
Directed Graph(SDG) is well known for representing cause and effect relation among 
the different variables. The method described here, maps a SDG to a BBN. First a 
brief overview on SDG is provided. Methods of obtaining SDG from mathematical 
equations and process knowledge are discussed. The mapping of SDG to a BBN is 
described. 
3.1 Signed Graph 
Signed graphs were first int roduced by Harary to handle a problem in social psychology 
[Cartwright and Harary, 1956] . Since then it has been applied in many fields of study 
such as physics, data clustering, diagnosis of root causes etc. In graph t heory, a signed 
graph refers to a graph in which each edge has a positive or negative sign. This is a 
graphical representation of cause effect relation among different variables. T he graph 
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(i) (ii) 
Figure 3.1: Signed Graph 
may have loops and multiple edges as well as half-edges (with only one endpoint) and 
loose edges (with no endpoints). Half and loose edges do not receive signs. In formal 
terms a digraph is a pair G = (X , Y ) Where 
• X is a set whose elements are called vertices or nodes, 
• Y is a set of ordered pairs of vertices, called arcs, directed edges, or arrows. 
Two signed graphs are shown in Fig. 3.1. Both graphs have t hree nodes A, B 
and C. Both A and B are connected to C by two arcs. 
In Fig. 3.1(i) Edges of these two arcs have a positive and a negative sign rep-
resenting the types of relations between nodes A - C and B - C respectively. The 
positive sign at the edge of the arc A - C means, if t here is an increase in A, this 
will result in an increase in C. The negative sign at the edge of arc B - C indicates 
an inverse relationship. An increase in A will result in a decrease in C or vice versa. 
This type of causal relations can be graphically represented by signed graphs. Both 
A and B nodes are called root nodes or causal nodes and node C is t he effect node. 
This is shown by the arc direction from the root nodes to the effect node. 
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Figure 3.2: Signed Directed Graph (SDG) 
In Fig. 3.1 (ii) A - C edge is a multi edge arc which has two positive signs. 
T his multi edge represents that both nodes A and C can now act as cause and effect 
nodes simultaneously. The signs assigned to the arc represents the relation between 
the nodes. 
3.2 Signed Directed Graph 
An extended version of signed graph is signed directed graph (SDG) which deals with 
only single edge arcs. Nodes of the SDGs are assigned with posit ive, negative or a 
zero state. T hese represent the states of a nodes higher than, lower than or normal 
operating condit ion respectively. T he SDG can be defined as below 
In F ig. 3.2 two simple SDG is shown. Fig. 3.2 (i) shows relation between 
variable X and Y and Fig. 3.2 (ii ) shows relation between variable P and Q. 
Sign of node Sign of SDG nodes can be defined as below 
'lj;(v) = 0 faT I ::r:v- .f-v I< Ev, 
'l/J(v ) =+joT (xv - Xv) 2:: Ev, 
'lj;(v) =-for (.i'v - .Tv) 2:: Ev-
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(3.1) 
where xv is the measurement of the variable v , Xv is the normal value, and Ev is 
the threshold. 
Sign of arc This can be illustrated by Fig. 3.2(i) node X and node Y is 
connected by an arc from node X to Y. When X increases, Y also increases. Deviation 
of X and Y in the same direction. This relation is shown by the posit ive sign arc a1 . 
On the other hand , in Fig. 3.2(ii) node P and node Q is connected by an arc from 
node P to Q. When P increases, Q decreases. Deviation of P and Q in the opposite 
direction. This relation is shown by the negative sign arc a2 = -. 
3.3 Modelling of SDG 
SDGs can be constructed either from operational data and system knowledge, or 
mathematical models of the system. Various methods for building SDG are discussed 
below. 
3.3.1 SDG Modelling from Mathematical Equations 
SDG can be derived from the differential and algebraic equations of the system. The 
structure as well as signs of the graph can be derived from the different ial equations. 
An arc is drawn from the variables in the right hand side of an equation to the 
variables in the left hand side of that equation . The sign of the arc between the 
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Figure 3.3: SDG of a system with first order differential equation 
variables depends on the sign of the variables in the equation [Maurya et al., 2003]. 
A typical dynamic system can be expressed as a set of ODEs, 
(3.2) 
where (x1 , x2 , . . . . .. xn ) are state variables of the system, u 1 , u2 , u3 , .. ... un are input 
variables of the system and e is the disturbance. 
A first order system state variable x, input u and disturbance e, 
dx = - (!!!L)x + k u + (l...)e. dt a t a t (3.3) 
For the system defined by the Eqn. (3.3) , SDG can be constructed as shown in 
Fig. 3.3. An arc is constructed from e to x with a sign sgn[l / a 1] =+, an arc from u to 
x with a sign sgn [k] = + and a self-cycle on the node x with a sign - sgn[a0 / a1] = -
on the arc. 
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L -
Figure 3.4: Simple tank model 
3.3.1.1 SDG Modelling of a Simple Tank System from Mathematical 
Equations 
A simplified tank model is shown In Fig. 3.4. Water flows into the tank with flow 
rate F1 . The flow coming out of the tank, F2 is controlled by a flow valve V and level 
of water accumulation is denoted as L . 
Governing equations for the system are as below 
dL 
A-= F1- P.2 dt , (3.4a) 
F2 = v'L;v, (3.4b) 
here, A is the cross sectional area of the tank and Vis the valve resistance acting 
on the flow. 
SDG derived from the Eqn. (3.4) is shown in Fig. 3.5. Water flow F1 and F2 
have direct influence to water level accumulation in the tank described by Eqn. (3.4a) . 
Any positive change in F1 , will make positive change to L. This means that if inflow 
increases the accumulation will increase. To capture this process dynamics in SDG, 
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Figure 3.5: SDG of a simple tank model 
an arc from F1 (right side of equation) to L (left side of equation) with a positive sign 
is constructed. Again, a posit ive change in F2 , will make negative change to L. When 
out flow increases t he accumulation will decrease. To capture this process dynamics 
in SDG, and an arc from F2 to L with a negative sign is drawn . 
Outflow F2 is a function of both accumulated level and valve resistance V . An 
arc from V to F2 and another arc from L to F2 is drawn according to the Eqn. (3.4b). 
When the valve is open, valve resistance V on the flow is low, and there will be high 
out flow F2 . T his will decrease the water level L. Because the type of the relations 
among the variables V, F2 and L are opposite, the arcs are assigned with negative 
signs. 
3.3.2 SDG Modelling of a Simple Tank Syst em from Process 
Knowledge 
In most cases SDGs are built with process knowledge and experience. Often math-
ematical equation or model for a process is not available. P rocess dynamics and 
qualitative process knowledge remains as last resource to build a SDG. 
A simple tank model with controlled flow rates is shown in Fig. 3.6. Inflow F1 is 
cont rolled by a valve with flow resist ance VJ. . Since there is no controller F1 does not 
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Figure 3.6: Simple tank model with cont rolled flow rates 
Figure 3.7: SDG with controlled flow rates 
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affect V1. The relationship is unidirectional from V1 to F1 . Inflow F1 depends on the 
V1 , hence V1 is the cause and F1 is the effect of that. An arc from the V1 to F1 is draw 
with a negative sign. Accumulation is directly influenced by both inflow and outflow 
rates F1 , F2 and F3 . When inflow increases the accumulation increases. Therefore, a 
positive signed arc is drawn from F1 to L. Two arcs with negative sign are drawn from 
F2 to L and F3 to L. Because both out flow F2 and F3 will reduce accumulation in 
the tank. Both out flow F2 and F3 is controlled by two flow valves with flow resistance 
V2 and V3 respectively. When valve resistance 112 decreases, out flow F2 increases. 
Flow cont roller regulates the valve (resistance) to control the flow F2 . Similarly, when 
valve resistance V3 decreases, outflow F3 increases. Level controller regulates the valve 
(resistance) to control the flow F3 . Flow control and level control is shown by the 
other two negative arcs from F2 to V2 and L to V3 . Thus SDG can be obtained from 
only process dynamics without any process model or governing equation shown in 
Fig. 3.7. 
3.4 Mapping of SDG to BBN 
In SDG the type of relation among the variables is expressed in terms of arc sign 
where in BBN this relation is expressed in terms of conditional probability table. 
Mapping of SDG to BBN is shown in Fig. 3.8. Mapping of the SDG into 
BBN is done in two steps. First, SDG is developed from either process knowledge or 
mathematical equations described in section 3.3. After a SDG has been developed, 
it is mapped to the BBN based on both graphical and numerical translation. The 
structure of BBN is obtained from the graphical translation. T he nodes are connected 
in the same way as they are connected in the SDG. The root nodes, intermediate 
nodes and effect nodes are mapped into the BBN as parent nodes, intermediate nodes 
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Process Mathematical 
Knowledge Equation 
I SDG I 
~ 
I Mapping SDG to BBN I 
Root Nodes Gc.phl"l Tc.o.l•tl"{> Parent Nodes 
Intermediate 
Gc.phk• l Tc.o.l"loo~ Intermediate ~ ~ Nodes Nodes Gc.phl"" ""''"''"~ Chi I d Nodes Effect Nodes 
Arcs and edges 
" '"hl"l '""'''"'"~ Arcs and edges 
Arc Sign N"m"'" ' '""''"''"~ CPT Table 
BBN 
, 
BBN 
Consistent Make it acyclic 
? No 
Yes 
STOP 
Figure 3.8: Mapping SDG to BBN 
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B 
A TRUE FALSE 
TRUE 0 .95 0.05 
FALSE 0.1 0.9 
Figure 3.9: Mapping SDG to BBN 
and child nodes. On the other hand , in the numerical t ranslation, t he conditional 
probability tables of the BBN nodes are filled up based on the signs of the arcs in 
SDG. 
An arc with positive sign between the two nodes in the SDG refers that the 
direction of change in the causal node, will be followed by the effect node. This 
behaviour is mapped in BBN conditional probability table (CPT) between the same 
two nodes. In the CPT those two variables will be assigned with high probability 
value (greater t han 0.5) for the same state. Fig. 3.9 a SDG with two variables A and 
B is shown. With the graphical translation the structure of the BBN is obtained. 
The CPT for node B is obtained from the numerical translation. The arc from A to 
B is denoted with positive sign . In the CPT, when both A and B are in the same 
state, high probability value is assigned. P(B IA) = 0.95 with both A and B in the 
True state and P(BIA) = 0.9 with both A and B in t he False state. 
On the other hand, an arc with negative sign between the two nodes in the SDG 
refers t hat the direction of change in the causal node, will be opposite to the effect 
node. In the BBN CPT those two variables will be assigned with higher probability 
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B 
A TRUE FALSE 
TRUE 0.15 0.85 
FALSE 0.92 0.08 
Figure 3.10: Mapping SDG to BBN 
value (greater than 0.5) for the opposite state. The probability values can be obtained 
from the frequency analysis or expert judgement. Conditional probability tables il-
lustrate how intermediate nodes are related to precedent intermediate or root nodes 
which is similar to the arc sign in the SDG. Fig. 3.10 a SDG with two variables A 
and B is shown. The CPT for node B is obtained from the numerical translation. 
The arc from A to B is denoted with negative sign . In the CPT, when both A and 
B are in the opposite state, high probability value is assigned. P(B IA) = 0.85 with 
A in True state and B in the False state and P(BIA) = 0.92 with A in the False 
state and B in the T rue state. 
Often exact graphical translation of SDG into BBN may result in cyclic network. 
This is not consistent for BBN analysis. T herefore the cyclic network need to be 
converted to acyclic network without altering the process behaviour captured by the 
network. To avoid a loop, indirect relationship between the variables may be useful. 
This is demonstrated with example in t he next section. 
0 
High 75% 
Low 25% 
L 0 
Figure 3.11: Scenario 1: BBN of simple tank 
v 
3.4.1 Mapping of BBN Model for Simple Tank System 
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BBN for t he simple tank model shown in the Fig. 3.4 can be drawn as Fig. 3.11. 
The BBN structure is same as the SDG shown in Fig. 3.5, except for t he arc from V 
to L. Since BBN is acyclic by the definition, to make t he network consistent an arc 
from F2 to L is avoided. Instead of that, an arc from the V to L is drawn. From Eqn. 
(3 .4) it is evident that L is a function of both F1 and F2. Outflow F2 depends on V . 
Therefore, L has a dependency with V . This process knowledge is used to avoid the 
cyclic loop in BBN to make it consistent . 
Relation among the different variables are quant itatively expressed in terms of 
conditional probability. Prior probability and conditional probability table is shown 
in Table.(3.1 , 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4). 
Accumulat ion of water in the tank is function of both inflow rate F1 and valve 
st ate (open or close) . When inflow increases and valve is closed , accumulation is 
F1 
High 0.85 
Low 0.15 
Table 3. 1: Prior probability of inflow F1 
F1 High Low 
v Close Open Close Open 
L 
High 0.95 0.05 0.15 0.02 
Low 0.05 0.95 0.85 0.98 
Table 3.2: Conditional probability table for level L 
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higher. These relations are shown with different signs in the SDG. In BBN, posit ive 
and negative relation can be defined by the conditional probability table (CPT) shown 
in Table.(3.2). Accumulation is 0.95 when F1 has higher flow rate and the valve is 
closed. But accumulation is 0.02 when F1 has lower flow rate and the valve is open. 
This is how the posit ive or negative relation among the variables in the SDG can be 
transformed to the CPT to map a BBN from SDG. 
L High Low 
v Close Open Close Open 
F2 
High 0.3 0.95 0.05 0.8 
Low 0.7 0.05 0.95 0.2 
Table 3.3: Conditional probability table for outflow F2 
Probability inserts uncertainty into consideration. Prior probability of F1 and 
Vis set according to the Table.(3. 1 and 3.4) . 
3.4.1.1 Scenario 1: Validation of Conditional Probability 
From the process knowledge it is evident that if the inflow F1 is high and valve V is 
closed outflow F2 will be lower and it will result in high accumulation of level L. This 
v 
Close 0.9 
Open 0.1 
Table 3.4: Prior probability of valve V 
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process dynamics is justified by the BBN in Fig. 3.11 . When inflow is set to high 
probabili ty 85% and the valve is close with high probability of 90%, outflow F2 is low 
with 69%. The chance of accumulation of water in the tank is higher with 75%. 
3.4.1.2 Scenario 2: Validation of Conditional Probability 
0 F1 
0 v 
Figure 3.12: Scenario 2: BBN of simple tank 
A different scenario where inflow rate is high and the outlet valve is fully open 
is shown in Fig. 3.12. Here F1 has very high probability 100% and the valve opening 
has very high probability of 100%. 
It is evident from process dynamics, there will be very low amount of water 
accumulation in the tank. Because outlet valve is kept open . T his will result in 
Open 90% 
Close 10% 
Figure 3.13: Validation of Conditional Probability for controlled tank model 1 
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high out flow rate F2 . This process dynamics is illustrated by the BBN. L has low 
accumulation probability of 85% and F2 has high flow rate probability of 81%. 
It can be concluded that a BBN can be constructed from SDG if process model is 
available. If process model is not available, BBN can be built from process knowledge 
itself. Positive or negative arc which express the type of relations among the variables 
in SDG, can be defined in terms of conditional probability in BBN. 
3.4.2 BBN of Controlled Tank Model 
The tank model and corresponding SDG shown in the Fig. 3.6 and 3.7 is mapped 
to the BBN shown in the Fig. 3.13. The structure of the BBN is obtained from the 
graphical translation of the SDG model. To avoid loops in the BBN and to make it 
consistent , control loops are made acyclic. This is done by introducing two controller 
nodes C2 and C3 . One arc from the F2 to C2 is drawn to denote the flow control action. 
Depending on the flow F2 t he controller will take action to maintain the optimal flow 
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by opening or closing the valve which is shown by the Close Valve and Open Valve 
states of V2 . Another arc from the L to C3 is drawn to represent level control action. 
Depending on the level L the controller will take action to maintain the optimal level 
by opening or closing the valve which is shown by the Close Valve and Open Valve 
states of V3 . Here, no controller action is implemented since it will make the network 
a cyclic one. The controller action can be implemented by superposition to replicate 
the process behaviour. The following simulation results show how dynamic process 
behaviour was captured in BBN. 
In Fig. 3.13 shows that accumulation L is very low 97% due to high flow rate 
of both of F2 and F3 respectively 91% and 88%. To maintain the desired flow rate 
of F2 , controller 2 needs to close the valve. To implement this action, an arc from 
the C2 to \12 is needed. But the arc will make the BBN cyclic. Therefore to avoid 
this loop and make t he BBN an acyclic model In Fig. 3.14 the controller 2 action 
is implemented. Valve V2 is closed a bit to make flow rate F2 to optimum level. 
Therefore, accumulation is raised and controller action C2 is also minimised. The 
control loop of the level controller was avoided similarly. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The simulation results show that BBN for a system can be deduced from the governing 
equation of the model. The complete methodology is demonstrated with several 
simulation examples using GeNie 2.0. Various faults were assumed to calibrate the 
BBN and to verify cpt table and prior probability values. The cpt table values and 
the prior probability values are the inputs for BBN constructed in GeNie 2.0. These 
faults were assumed from the process dynamics. Often the model or the equations are 
not available. In that case system dynamics and process knowledge can be helpful to 
Open 40% 
Close 50% 
Open 90% 
Close10% 
Figure 3.14: Valida tion of Conditional Probability for controlled tank model 2 
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build a BBN model. First SDG is built, than SDG can be mapped into BBN discussed 
in Fig. 3.8. The prior probability and conditional probability tables can be obtained 
by expert judgement where enough historical data is not available. In addit ion to 
that, BBN can be useful for diagnosis or in root cause analysis. For process with 
complex structure, operators often performs very complex analysis to find the root 
cause of a fault . Often due to lot of factors (Mental pressure, Working conditions 
etc.) t his manual diagnosis is erroneous during the process fault conditions. In this 
context BBN provide solution in need for an automated diagnostic tool. 
Chapter 4 
PCA-BBN Based Hybrid Method 
for Process Fault Detection and 
Diagnosis 
In this chapter an automated fault detection and diagnosis tool is described. This 
hybrid tool is the combination of PCA and BB . PCA detects the fault and prelim-
inarily diagnose the root cause. BBN takes detection and diagnosis results of PCA 
and further refines it based on the process knowledge to accurately pinpoint the root 
cause of a fault . 
4.1 PCA-BBN Hybrid Method 
The PCA-BB hybrid FDD algorithm is shown using a flowchart in Fig. 4.1. This 
algorithm has two essential parts. They are fault detection using PCA. Once fault is 
detected , diagnosis is done using BBN. The loop execu tion will occur at each sampling 
instant of the available data set. 
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modelling 
Detection On-line Fault 
Diagnosis 
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Off-line BBN 
Initialization 
Figure 4.1: P CA-BBN hybrid fault detection and diagnosis method 
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Before a sensor measurement is fed to the PCA-BBN, it needs to be validated. 
Sensor validation allows to detect sensor faults locally and does not require any fur-
ther analysis. Typically in a process system measurement will always show small 
random variations due to t he fluctuation in t he system and measurement noise of the 
sensors. If the a sensor does not shown any movement for an extended period that 
is indication of sensor malfunction. Simple logic check is implemented here to detect 
the sensor fault. For example, If no variation is found in the measurement for the 
seven consecutive samples (i.e. less than 10- 6 ) compare to the present measurement, 
the sensor is said to be faulty. 
( 4.1) 
Here ·i = 1, 2, 3, .. .. , 7. 
Again, if the change in the measured data is unusually high or low the sensor is 
said to be faulty. This can only happen when measured variable has a sharp rise or 
sharp fall. For a slow system like process these sharp changes are unusual. 
A faulty sensor can be pinpointed correctly through sensor validation. This 
sensor authentication makes the diagnostic tool more robust. Whenever a fault is 
detected for a variable, sensor validation algorithm ensures the integrity of sensor 
measurement. 
If sensor is found to be operating, The PCA model (the loading vectors) is used 
for process monitoring by projecting the on-line data onto the PC subspace. On-line 
data set Xt is projected by linear transformation and PCs of on-line data set can be 
expressed by the following equation, 
(4.2) 
41 
Here, Sis the PC or score vectors of on-line data, i = 1, 2, 3 .... .. m, PiERmxr and 
r is the number of principal component r ::; m . 
Each of the Principal components or score vectors capture as much variation as 
possible which has not been explained by the former PCs. The maximum number of 
principal components are equal to the total number of the variables. 
For on-line fault detection, PCA model is built from the normal operating con-
dit ion data. Off-line PCA model is built from a given dat a matrix X , of normal 
operating condition , of dimension ER Nxm where N is t he number of sample data and 
m is the number of the correlated variables in the data set . Init ially data set X 
is pre-processed by auto-scaling (mean zero and variance one) . Then off-line P CA 
model is obtained from the SVD analysis of covariance matrix of auto-scaled data set 
[Jackson, 2005, Afifi and Clark, 2004]. 
The covariance matrix of X can be defined as 
xrx 
cov(X) = -N . 
- 1 
SVD analysis of covariance matrix X decomposes as follows: 
SV D[cov(X)] = PAPT. 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
where A is a diagonal matrix with significant eigenvalues and P contains the 
respective eigenvectors also known as loading vectors and the basis vector of the 
principal subspace [Smith, 2002]. T his obtained eigenvectors P is the PCA model is 
used for on-line process monitoring. This principal subspace has a lower dimension 
than the original data set X and yet is able to capt ure or explain significant portion 
of the information content (or the variance) in the original data set . 
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PCA model prediction for all variables can be expressed by as follows , 
r 
it= "£8iPi . ( 4.5) 
·i=l 
it is the model prediction. 
Residual is calculated from the difference between the model projection and 
projected data set [Jolliffe, 2005]. Residual E for an on-line sample X t , is calculated 
according to the following formula, 
A confidence limit for E can be calculated as follows 
Q = () (c,J202!iJ + 1 + 02ho(ho- l ) ) (f-) 
e 1 o, ~~ 0 ) 
1 
fJi = L:j=r+l(-\j )i, 
ho = 1- 2&,ga 3112 • 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
where C,:x is obtained from the normal distribution limits for the upper (1 - a) 
percentile [Jackson and M udholkar, 1979]. 
During the normal operating condition threshold defined by Eqn. ( 4. 7) is not 
violated and data for new time instant is monitored for fault . But for the abnormal 
condition the residual exceeds its threshold limit. Upon successful detection of fault , 
PCA contribution of each variable is analysed. 
Contribution of i - th variable to the Q-statistic can be calculated as 
(4.8) 
Here (3 is a column vector i-th element is one and the others are zero and 
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Figure 4.2: Message passing in BBN after evidence coming to the nodes 
i = 1, 2, 3 ..... m [Liu, 2012]. 
For on-line fault diagnosis contribution of each variable is used as evidence for 
the BBN. Depending upon this on-line evidence, BBN updates its belief of each node. 
Contribut ion as evidence input for the parent nodes is denoted as c+ and contribution 
as evidence input for the child nodes is denoted as c- . The contribution matrix is 
(4.9) 
In Fig. 4.3 a BBN with tree structure is shown. U1 , U2 and U3 are parent nodes 
and Y1 , Y2 and Y3 are child nodes. Message from the parent nodes to the child nodes 
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are denoted as 1r messages and message from t he child nodes to the parent nodes are 
denoted as >. message. 
Init ially each parent node in BBN is initiated by prior probability. Prior belief 
of parent nodes is calculated by evidence from the PCA and init ia lly calculated prior 
probability. 
bel(Ui) - P(c{IU;)P(U;) 
P(cf) (4.10) 
here P(Ui) is prior probability of node Ui, bel(Ui) is prior belief of node Ui and 
i = 1, 2, 3 .... , p number of the pa rent nodes. 
By top-down propagation parent nodes prior belief is passed to the child nodes. 
Child nodes calculate the prior belief with the help of the condit ional probability table 
and the prior belief of the parent nodes. 
bel(}j) = a17rz(}j)P(}ji Z), 
= BEL(Z)P(}jiZ) 
(4.11) 
here a 1 is a normalizing constant and for all states of }j, bel (}j ) is prior belief 
of node }j and j = 1, 2, 3 ... . , c number of the child nodes. 
Belief of node Z is calculated simultaneously insp ecting the message from its 
parents 1r(Z) and t he messages from its children >. (Z) . Using this inputs, it updates 
its belief 
BEL(Z) = az>. (Z)1r(Z). (4.12) 
here CXz is a normalizing constant and for all states of Z 
l: BEL(Z) = 1. (4. 13) 
z 
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where 
p 
1r(Z) = L 1fu; (Z)P(Z IUi). (4.14) 
i=l 
c 
>.(Z) = L Ayj (Z)P(Yj iZ ). (4.15) 
j = l 
Then each child node updates its prior belief to posterior belief based on the 
evidence coming from PCA. 
BEL(Yj ) = a.ibel (Yj )P(cj ). (4.16) 
Posterior belief of the child node in sent to the parent node by bottom up belief 
propagation. 
( 4.17) 
Then each parent node updates its prior belief to posterior belief based on the 
posterior belief of the child nodes. 
( 4.18) 
(4.19) 
This updating process continues until each node is updated to the posterior 
belief. At next time instant each node receive new evidence from the PCA and 
posterior belief of the previous time instant becomes prior belief for next time instant. 
Belief propagation start again unt il t he network is converged. 
Belief propagation between the parent nodes and child nodes follows Pearl's mes-
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sage passing algorithm. Prior belief of every node is rectified by both PCA evidence 
and process knowledge. Initially some non-faulty variables may show up as faulty in 
the PCA contribution plot . But when they are updated based on the evidence and 
current process knowledge in t he BBN, their posterior belief reflects the real condition 
of the variable and removes the ambiguity of diagnosis. In this fashion the inference 
network can track a changing environment and provide the most updated possible 
condition. 
A real t ime hybrid process monitoring technique based on PCA and BBN for 
process fault detection and diagnosis is described here. The proposed hybrid method 
uses the diagnostic results from PCA and combines with process knowledge captured 
in a BBN. Thus the method is able to accurately pinpoint the root cause of a fault 
which is shortcomings of PCA and other statistical fault detection and diagnosis 
approaches. 
4.2 Diagnosis using Sensor Measurement as Evi-
dence 
Sensor measurements can be used as evidence instead of P CA contribution informa-
tion. The complete algorithm for this is shown in Fig. 4.3. Initially measurement 
is validated by sensor validation algorithm. If sensor is found normal operating then 
sensor measurement is further processed. 
Sensor measured data is compared with the corresponding set point value to 
obtain the residual. Residual of each variable is used as evidence input for the BBN. 
( 4.20) 
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Figure 4.3: Diagnosis using sensor measurement as evidence 
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Here, Xr is the residual of variable X , X m is the measurement from the sensor 
and X s is the set point of X. 
Probability of fault increases as residual of a variable goes away from the normal 
operating limit . In this case absolute value of residual is considered and the normal 
operating condit ion limit is defined as p, + 3o- of normal operating data. When the 
residual exceeds this limit the process is said to be in faulty condition. The probability 
that X is faulty is calculated from the following equation 
(4.21) 
Here, X r is the absolute residual value of variable X. 
These obtained values are introduced as evidence for the BBN nodes. BBN 
diagnosed the fault using message passing algorithm discussed in t he previous section. 
4.3 Conclusions 
A PCA-BBN based hybrid monitoring tool is proposed in this chapter. Performance 
of the proposed method is demonstrated using a PTA tank model. Various fault 
scenarios were considered. Results are shown in the next Chapter. 
Chapter 5 
Results and Discussions 
In this chapter the performance of the proposed diagnostic tool is demonstrated using 
simulation and industrial case study. The system is a model of a dissolution tank to 
dissolve terephtalic acid crystals in order to remove impurities to form pure tereph-
talic acid (PTA) . After testing the diagnostic tool in simulation environment , data 
was collected from the real process. The diagnostic tool was validated using industrial 
data. The organization of this chapter is as follows, first the construction of the BBN 
for t he dissolution tank system is described. Prior probability and conditional proba-
bility were assigned and verified by simulating several different scenarios. Next, with 
various simulated faults in the system the proposed hybrid method was applied to 
detect and diagnose the root cause of the fault . Performance of the proposed method 
was compared with the BBN where sensor measurements were used as evidence. Fi-
nally, the PCA-BBN hybrid method is validated using industrial data from the PTA 
dissolution tank for a known fault condition. 
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5.1 Dissolution Tank Model 
A simplified process diagram for the dissolution tank system , is shown in Fig. 5.1 
[Mallick and Imtiaz, 2011]. In this system solid terepthalic acid crystals are dissolved 
in a tank with water. Water is pumped into the tank under flow control. PTA 
crystals are fed to the dissolution tank from a hopper using a rotary feeder. The 
feed ra te of solid crystals to the mixing vessel is controlled by the speed of the rotary 
feeder (RPM) . The water level in tank and the concentration of the liquid going 
out of the tank are continuously measured variables. The solid flow is calculated 
intermittent ly from loss of weight of the load-cell. The control objectives of the system 
are to maintain the concentration at desired set point and prevent overflow or dry out 
in the tank. Under the existing control strategy, two PID controllers are used to meet 
these objectives, the concentration of the outlet stream is controlled by manipulating 
the rot ary valve rpm, while t he flow cont roller under cascade control maintains the 
tank level. 
However, the concentration at t he outlet is subject to frequent large disturbances 
when the operators have to take control of the process and manually drive the process 
out of the abnormal condition. Major cause of the disturbance is the difficulty in 
solid dispensing. Occasionally because of the variation in moisture content the solid 
gets lumped in the rotary feeder. As a result solid does not dispense from the feeder 
uniformly. After a while when the lump gets too big it falls into the tank creating a big 
disturbance in the concentration which causes a further problem in the downstream 
process. The other causes include disturbances in the water level due to the poor 
cont rol of water flow sensor malfunction, stiction of water flow valve etc. Objective 
of the monitoring scheme is to develop an au tomated fault detection and diagnosis 
system that will detect the fault early and will also precisely point to root cause of 
Water 
F1 
Ctystals 
e ------- ~ - ---- - ---------
I I 
Figure 5.1: Dissolut ion tank model with existing cont rol strategy 
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fault. 
5.2 SDG for Dissolution Tank Model 
First order different ial equations for the PTA dissolution tank model are as below, 
(5.1a) 
(5.1b) 
Here, F1 is inflow of water into the tank, F2 is t he outlet flow. Solid inflow rate 
is F3 and C is the outpu t concentration. A is t he cross sectional area of the tank, V 
volume of the tank, a 1 and a 2 are process constants. 
With these governing Eqn. (5.1) SDG model for the dissolut ion tank model can 
be developed following t he methodology discussed in Section. 3.3. Three arcs from 
node F1 , F2 and F3 to node L are drawn. The sign of the arcs are positive, negative 
and positive respectively according to Eqn. (5.1a). Three arcs from node F1 , F2 and 
F3 to node C are drawn. The signs of the arcs are positive, negative and positive 
respectively according to Eqn. (5.1b). Rest of the network is developed based on the 
process knowledge. The simplified SDG model is shown in Fig. 5.2. 
Since RPM drives the solid flow rotary valve RV, a positive arc from the RPM 
node to the RV node is drawn. The solid flow rate is proport ional to rotary valve 
revolution which is denoted by a positive arc from the RV node to the solid flow rate 
S uode. Solid flow has direct impact on concentration. This relation is shown by an 
arc drawn form S node to node C. Water flow is controlled by the flow valve FV 
and water flow is directly related to the water level L . These relations are captured 
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Figure 5.2: SDG for dissolution tank model 
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Figure 5.3: SDG for dissolut ion tank model 
in the SDG by arcs drawn from F V to F1 node and from F1 to L node respectively. 
Outflow F2 has inverse impact on the water level L . This is shown by a negative arc 
from F2 to L. For this process outflow F2 was maintained controlled manually and 
there was no flow sensor for F2 . T herefore, the impact of F2 can be neglected and a 
simplified SDG can be obtained as shown in Fig. 5.3. 
5.3 Mapping of Dissolution Tank SDG to BBN 
The SDG for dissolution tank model shown in Fig. 5.3 is mapped to BBN shown 
in Fig. 5.4 following the methodology described in Section. 3.4. In this case there 
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Figure 5.4: BBN for dissolut ion tank model 
is no cycle in the SDG therefore the graphical structure for BBN is same as the 
SDG. Conditional probability values and prior probability values for the BBN were 
assigned based on process knowledge and expert judgement. The network is init iated 
with the probability values given in Table. 5.1-5.7. The numerical translation requires 
conversion of signed relationships to conditional probability tables. T hese assigned 
probability values were validated by simulating various scenarios described in the 
following sections. 
OK NOT OK 
RPM 0.8 0.2 
Table 5.1: Prior probability of RPM 
RPM 
Rotary Valve OK NOT OK 
OK 0.9 0.05 
Not OK 0.1 0.95 
Table 5.2: Conditional probability table for rotary valve 
OK NOT OK 
Water Flow Valve 0.85 0.15 
Table 5.3: Prior probability of water flow rate 
Water Flow Valve 
Water Flow OK 
OK 0.93 
Not OK 0.07 
NOT OK 
0.08 
0.92 
Table 5.4: Conditional probability t able for water flow 
Solid Flow 
OK 
Not OK 
Rotary Valve 
OK Not OK 
0.85 0.1 
0.15 0.9 
Table 5.5: Conditional probability table for solid flow 
Density 
OK 
Not OK 
Water Flow OK Not OK 
Solid Flow OK Not OK OK Not OK 
0.95 
0.05 
0.1 
0.9 
0.65 
0.35 
0.01 
0.99 
Table 5.6: Conditional probability table for density 
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Solid Flow OK Not OK 
Water Flow OK Not OK OK Not OK 
Water Level 
OK 0.9 0.05 0.75 0.01 
NOT OK 0.1 0.95 0.25 0.99 
Table 5.7: Conditional probability table for water level 
65% 
Not OK35% 
Density 
K 61% 
Not_OK39% 
o Water Flow Valve 
OK 
Water Level 
OK 69% 
Not OK31 % 
Figure 5.5: Scenario 1: No fault condition 
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Variable 
RPM 
Rotary Valve 
Water Flow Valve 
Solid Flow 
Water Flow 
D ensity 
Water Level 
State in BBN 
OK 
ot OK 
OK 
Not OK 
OK 
Not OK 
OK 
Not OK 
OK 
Not OK 
OK 
Not OK 
OK 
Not OK 
Actual State 
RPM tracking set point 
Controller or Sensor Fault 
Smoot h operating valve 
Sticky valve or other faults in the valve 
Smooth operating valve 
Sticky valve or other faults in the valve 
Uniform flow of solid 
Uneven flow due to clogging of solid 
Uniform flow of water 
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Non uniform water flow due to the faulty valve 
Density tracking the set point (no fault condition) 
Density not tracking the set point (fault condition) 
Water Level tracking the set point (no fault condition) 
Water Level not tracking the set point (fault condition) 
Table 5.8: Varia ble states in BBN 
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5.3.1 Validation of Condit ional Probability 
The mapped BBN captures the process cause and effect relationship between differ-
ent variable. Several simulations are shown to demonstrate validation of conditional 
probability values assignment. 
5.3 .1.1 Scenario 1: No fault condition 
Fig. 5.5 shows BBN for dissolution tank model initiated with prior probability val-
ues given in Tables 5.1-5.7. Here, RPM node is initiated with 80% OK state and 
Water- Flow Rate node is initiated with 85% OK state. Rotar-y Valve node has 
high probability for being in the operating state as RPM node has high value of OK 
states. This results in uniform solid flow of 65%. Since water flow directly depends 
on the performance of water flow valve which is held at 0 K state cause water flow 
to be at OK state with 80% of probability. Consequently the probability of both 
Density and Water- Level are at desired level is high 61% and 69% respectively. This 
result reflects the causality between process variables in terms of probability values 
correctly. 
5.3 .1.2 Scenario 2: Fault in t he Rotary Valve 
We need the same probability values given in Table. 5.1-5.7 and use those to investi-
gate the diagnosis ability of the network in case of a fault in the rotary valve. When 
rotary valve is not operating properly due to valve stiction , density at the outlet is af-
fected. This may results in non-uniform solid flow at 90% probability. The probability 
for D ensity and Water- Level to be at the desired level are 16% and 62% respectively 
are affected by high probability of non-uniform solid flow. This is expected process 
behaviour because solid flow has more influence on density and disturbance in solid 
0 
OK 16% 
Not_OK84% Not OK38% 
Figure 5.6: Scenario 2: Fault in the Rotary Valve 
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flow has significant effect on density. On the other hand, water flow and water flow 
valve are in 0 J( state. Therefore, fault in solid flow should not affect the tank level 
significantly as shown in Fig. 5.6. 
5.3.1.3 Scenario 3: Fault in the Water Flow Valve 
In this case we consider fault in water flow valve. To simulate this scenario BBN for 
dissolut ion tank model shown in Fig. 5.7 is initiated with prior probability given in 
the Tables 5.1-5.7. Since WateT F low Valve node is set at Nat OK state, this will 
result in non-uniform water flow of 92%. Solid flow is not affected as rotary valve is 
held at the operating state with 73% probability. The probability for both Density 
and Water Level to be a t desired set points drops to 44% and 10% respectively. In a 
process we expect similar behaviour as water flow is a strong handle for the controller. 
The density will also be impacted but to lesser degree. 
BBN can be very handy diagnostic tool. Root cause of any incident can easily 
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0 
OK 44% 
Not OK56% 
Figure 5. 7: Scenario 3: Fault in the Water Flow Valve 
be detected using BBN. The following simulation results demonstrate the power of 
BBN as diagnost ic tool. 
5.3.2 Scenario 4: Fault in Density Node 
To demonstrate the power of diagnosis, a simulation case study for the dissolution tank 
model is shown in Fig. 5.8. A fault in density was introduced by setting Densdy node 
at Not OK with 100% probability. Solid flow has more influence on the density than 
water flow. Therefore, Not 0 K state of Density must be the result of non-uniform 
solid flow 82% probability. The nature of solid flow whether it will be uniform or not, 
will completely depend on the rotary valve performance. Simulation result shows that 
non-uniform solid flow is because of Rotary Valve malfunction with 57% probability. 
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Figure 5.8: Scenario 4: Fault in Density Node 
5.3.3 Scenario 5: Fault in Water Level Node 
A fault in water level was introduced by setting W ate1· Level node at Not OK state 
with 100% probability. This simulation case study is shown in Fig. 5.9. Water flow 
has more influence on the water level than solid flow. Therefore, Not OK state of 
Water Level must be the result of non-uniform 55% probability water flow. The 
nature of water flow whether it will be uniform or not, will completely depend on the 
water flow valve performance. Simulation result shows that non-uniform water flow 
is because of WateT Flow Valve in Not OK condition with 52% probability. 
5.4 PCA-BBN Hybrid M ethod as a Diagnostic Tool 
The hybrid method was successfully implemented on the dissolution tank model for 
simulated faults. First, in case study 1, a fault is introduced in water flow and in case 
study 2 a fault is introduced in solid flow rate. In both cases fault was det ected and 
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0 
K 44% 
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Figure 5.9: Scenario 5: Fault in Water Level Node 
diagnose correctly. Sampling rate for this data was 1 sec. 
5.4.1 Diagnosis of Simulated Fault 
5.4.1.1 Scenario 1: Fault in Water Flow 
A ramp type fault of maximum magnitude which is about 6% of the nominal signal 
variation was introduced in water flow at t = 3100 m·in as a result water level exceeded 
threshold level at t = 3190 min in Fig. 5.10. This fault is detected at t = 3160 min 
from PCA residual plot, as it violates Q-statistic threshold level shown in Fig. 5. 11. 
From PCA contribution plot Fig. 5.12 its difficult to diagnose the fault correctly, as it 
is seen that all the variables have significant cont ribution for the fault except density. 
This is due to the smearing effect discussed in Section 4.1. This preliminary diagnosis 
information was supplied to the calibrated BBN which correctly diagnose the water 
flow as root cause the fault in Fig. 5.13. Evidence from both density and water level 
120 
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Figure 5.10: Scenario 1: A ramp type fault in water level 
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Figure 5. 11: Scenario 1: PCA residual plot detecting the fault in water level 
63 
c:: g 
::::1 
.0 
·.::: 
-c:: 
0 
(.) 
64 
Contribution Plot 
1~----.-----------.-----------.-----------.-----, 
Water Flow Solid Flow Water Level Density 
Figure 5.12: Scenario 1: PCA contribut ion plot 
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Figure 5.13: Scenario 1: Root cause diagnosis from BBN 
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Posterior Probability 
Water Flow Valve Sensor 
Variable 
Figure 5.14: Root cause diagnosis from BBN within the water flow loop 
updates the posterior probability of both water flow rate and solid flow node. Because 
fault in water level has stronger relation with water flow rate than solid flow, the root 
cause of t he fault was diagnosed correctly. Further to find out whether the fault is 
associated with t he sensor or valve, diagnosis in the water flow loop is conducted. 
Sensor validation provided a very little chance of sensor fault . Since the measurement 
instruments was no faulty, the only remaining cause for the water flow fault is found 
to be the water flow valve (Fig.5.14). 
5.4.1.2 Scenario 2: Fault in Solid Flow 
A fault was int roduced in solid flow at t = 3100 min, as a result a fault in density is 
observed at t = 3160 min in Fig. 5.15. This fault is detected early at t = 3130 min 
from PCA residual plot, as it violates Q-statistic threshold level shown in Fig. 5.16. 
From PCA contribution plot Fig. 5. 17 its difficult to diagnose the fault correctly 
contribut ions of all variables are comparable. This is due to the smearing effect dis-
cussed in Section 4.1. Using this preliminary diagnosis information the BBN correctly 
diagnose t he solid flow as root cause of the fault in Fig. 5.18. Evidence from both 
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Figure 5.15: Scenario 2: Fault in density 
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Figure 5.16: Scenario 2: PCA early fault detection 
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Figure 5.17: Scenario 2: PCA contribution plot 
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Figure 5.18: Scenario 2: Root cause diagnosis from BBN 
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Figure 5.19: Root cause diagnosis from BBN within solid flow loop 
density and water level updates the posterior probability of bot h water flow rate and 
solid flow node. Because fault in density has stronger relation with solid flow than 
water flow rate t he root cause of the fault was diagnosed correctly. Further to find 
out whether the fault is associated with the sensor or valve, diagnosis in the solid flow 
loop was conducted. Sensor validation provides a very little chance of sensor fault. 
Since the solid flow sensor was not faulty, the only remaining cause for the solid flow 
fault is found to be the solid flow valve (Fig.5 .19). 
5.4.2 Comparison of PCA-BBN Method with BBN using 
Sensor Data Directly as Evidence 
In order to compare the hybrid PCA-BBN with the tradit ional use of BBN, a fault 
was int roduced in t he solid flow at t = 3100 min, as a result a fault in density was 
observed at t = 3160 min in Fig. 5. 15 when it violates the threshold limit . Residuals 
are calculated from difference between set point (desired value) and observed value of 
each variable. The BBN correctly diagnosed the solid flow as root cause of t he fault 
as shown in Fig. 5.20. Evidence from density and water level update the posterior 
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Figure 5.20: Root cause diagnosis from BBN 
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Figure 5.21: Root cause diagnosis from BBN within solid flow Loop 
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probability of both water flow rate and solid flow node. Because fault in density has 
stronger relation with solid flow than water flow rate the root cause of the fault was 
pinpointed correctly. Furt her to find out whether the fault is associated with the 
sensor or valve, diagnosis within the solid flow loop was conducted. Sensor validation 
provides a low probability of sensor fault . Since the measurement instruments are 
validated successfully, the only remaining cause for the solid flow fault is found to be 
the solid flow valve shown in Fig. 5.21. 
From the above results it is seen that for both cases (PCA contribution as 
evidence and sensor data as evidence) root cause of the fault was detected successfully. 
When sensor data was used as evidence, the fault was detected at t = 3160 min 
shown in Fig. 5.15 compare to the hybrid case where fault was detected at t = 
3130 min shown in Fig. 5.16. PCA Q-statistic detects the fault earlier. This early 
fault detection initiates the root cause analysis earlier compare to the sensor data as 
evidence case. This lead t ime in diagnosis can provide the operators an opportuni ty 
to steer the process to the normal operating condit ion during the process fault. 
5.5 Industrial Case Study : PTA Dissolut ion Tank 
Industrial data from the dissolution tank of a PTA plant was collected. The data 
set contained normal operational data as well as a known process fault in the solid 
discharge. The data set consists of measurements of four process variables. They are 
water flow rate, solid flow rate, tank water level and solution density at the outlet of 
the tank. T he sampling frequency of the data was 15 sec. This data set was used 
to validate P CA-BBN hybrid algorithm and the tradit ional BBN with sensor data as 
evidence. 
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PCA Fau~ Detection 
Sample X 104 
Figure 5.22: PCA early fault detection 
5.5.1 Diagnosis using Hybrid Method: Industrial Case Study 
Due to the actuator problem a chunk of solid drops into the tank at 10352 sample, as a 
result a fault in density is observed at 10512 sample in Fig. 5.26. This fault is detected 
early at 10383 sample from PCA residual plot , as it violates Q-statistic t hreshold level 
shown in Fig. 5.22. From PCA contribution plot Fig. 5.23 it is difficult to diagnose 
the fault correctly as it is seen that all the variables have significant contribution 
for the fault due to the smearing effect discussed in Section 4.1. These contributions 
were used as evidence to update the BBN. The BBN is init iated with prior probability 
calculated from the expert judgement. The trained BBN correctly diagnosed the solid 
flow as root cause of t he fault as shown in Fig. 5.24. When ever new evidence come 
to solid flow node, the node update its own belief and propagates its belief to the 
density node and the water level node. Evidence coming to the density node updates 
the prior belief of density to the posterior belief and propagates its belief to the both 
water flow node and solid flow node. Solid flow node then updates its belief based 
on the information it gets from the density node. With the similar process belief 
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PCA Contribution Plot 
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Figure 5.23: PCA Contribution to fault 
Posterior Probability 
Density 
Figure 5.24: Root cause diagnosis from BBN 
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Solid Flow Valve Sensor 
Figure 5.25: Root cause diagnosis from BBN within solid flow loop 
is propagated among water flow , water level and solid flow node. When belief of all 
node is updated network stabilizes and wait for the next evidence. Further to find out 
whether t he fault is associated with t he sensor or valve, diagnosis in the solid flow loop 
is conducted. Sensor validation provided a small probability for sensor fault. Since 
the measurement instruments are validated successfully, the only remaining cause for 
the solid flow fault is found to be the solid flow valve as shown in Fig.5 .25. 
5.5.2 Industrial Case Study: Comparison of PCA-BBN Method 
with BBN using Sensor Data Directly as Evidence 
Residuals are calculated from t he difference between set point (desired value) and 
observed value of each variable was used to detect fault. Residuals were calculated for 
density water flow rate and water level. Solid flow was a calculated signal from the 
loss of weight of t he load cell and such residual could not be calculated for solid flow. 
T he fault was detected by the density residuals at 10512 sample. After the fault was 
detected the posterior probability of density node was set to 1. The BBN correctly 
diagnose the solid flow as root cause of t he fault in Fig. 5.29. Evidence from density 
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Figure 5.26: Fault detected in densi ty 
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Figure 5.30: Root cause diagnosis from BBN within solid flow loop 
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Figure 5.31: Comparison of PCA-BB Method with BBN using Sensor Data Directly 
as Evidence 
and water level updated t he posterior probability of water flow and solid flow node. 
Because fault in density has stronger relation with solid flow than water flow the root 
cause of the fault was ident ified as solid flow problem correctly. Further to find out 
whether the fault is associated with the sensor or valve, diagnosis in the solid flow loop 
is conducted. Sensor validation provides a very low probability of sensor fault. Since 
the measurement instruments are validated successfully, the only remaining cause for 
the solid flow fault is found to be the solid flow valve Fig.5 .30. 
From the above results it is seen that for both cases (PCA contribution as 
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evidence and sensor da ta as evidence) root cause of the fault was detected successfully. 
When sensor data was used as evidence, the fault was detected at 10512 sample 
compared to the hybrid case where fault was detected at 10383 sample in Fig. 5.31. 
This early fault detection initiates the root cause analysis earlier for the hybrid model 
compared to the sensor data as evidence case. This lead time for diagnosis can provide 
the operators an opportunity to steer the process to the normal operating condition 
during the process fault. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Hybrid method is applied for both simulated faulty scenarios and industrial case study. 
PCA detected the fault early but diagnosis was not precise since PCA contribution 
plot showed more than one variables to be faulty. BBN resolve this diagnosis problem 
with the help of both PCA evidence and process knowledge. Again the proposed 
hybrid method detects and diagnose the fault early compare to the existing methods 
where sensor measurements are use as evidence for the BBN. It is assumed for this case 
study that quality of input material and temperature will not change. Moreover, these 
parameters were considered to be constant in the dataset provided by the industry. 
Mult ivariate analysis (PCA) is used to taken care of any input changes. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Future Work 
6.1 Conclusion 
An automated fault detection and diagnosis method is developed. T his hybrid method 
is a combination of both PCA and BBN. The proposed hybrid method uses the diag-
nostic outputs from P CA and combines with process knowledge captured in a BBN. 
T he method is able to accurately pinpoint the root cause of a fault which is lacking in 
PCA and other statistical fault detection and diagnosis approaches. T he methodology 
is demonstrated using a solid crystal dissolution tank example. Various fault scenarios 
were considered along with a industrial case study. The method successfully detected 
the fault early allowing the operator to take corrective action. Also, it diagnose the 
root cause precisely. 
T he outcome of the current research can be summarized as below 
A methodology to construct BBN for process fault detection and diagnosis is 
developed. T he proposed network is slight ly different from the BBN found in 
the literature. Typically a separate BBN is built for each fault. In the proposed 
approach we built one universal network that can be used for mult iple fault. 
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11 A method of mapping BBN from the SDG is proposed. 
m A method of calibrating BBN using simulation scenarios is proposed. Calibra-
tion is pivotal in diagnosing different faults using single BBN. 
IV Updating mechanism of BBN using evidence from PCA is described in the thesis. 
v A real time automated hybrid methodology based on Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) and Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) for fault detection and 
diagnosis is described. The proposed hybrid method detected fault early and 
diagnosed the root cause precisely. BBN overcome the limitations of P CA in 
diagnosis fault accurately. The effectiveness of t he proposed methodology is 
demonstrated using both simulated and industrial data. 
vi This proposed monitoring tool can detect and diagnose the fault ahead of time. 
T his lead time can be significant for ensuring safe operation of a process plant. 
6.2 Future Work 
Since BBN is a directed acyclic graph, this method is applicable for acyclic 
process only. Further research is required to represent a general class of systems 
(process systems with cycles) using BBN. 
ii This hybrid tool can work as building block for fault tolerant cont roller. Once 
root cause of a fault is diagnosed correctly wit h sufficient confidence t hat in-
formation can be processed by a decision making tool to take the appropriate 
corrective action and the whole process can be automated . 
iii This method is verified for single fault scenarios. Further research is required 
to investigate multiple fault scenarios. 
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iv Further research is required to evaluate performance of this proposed method 
in case of process knowledge. 
v The SDG can be developed from either mathematical equations or first principle 
model of the process. In case where the first principle model is not available 
SDG can be built from the mathematical equations. For a large system this 
could be complicated. To overcome this, t he system can be divided into few 
subsystems and for each subsystem a different SDG can be built and further 
mapped to a BBN. 
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